I missed this item in yesterday's New York Times:
A bicycle bomb exploded in a popular shopping district in central Istanbul on Thursday, causing panic and wounding eight people, Turkish officials said.
Friday, May 27, 2011
Bomb Wounds 8 in Heart of Istanbul | NYTimes.com
Thursday, May 26, 2011
Turkey Presses Harder for Return of Antiquities - NYTimes.com
From the New York Times's Susanne Güsten:
After years of pleading in vain for the return of Anatolia’s cultural treasures from Western museums, Turkey has started playing hardball. And it is starting to see some results.
Wednesday, May 25, 2011
Füle on Turkey-EU relations, visa waivers etc [video]
From EUX.tv's youtube channel:
European Commissioner for Enlargement Stefan Füle on Wednesday [May 18] told European business leaders that Turkey is a key contributor to the Euroepan Union's global economic power.You'll find the video below. It contains nothing revolutionary except that Füle remains surprisingly upbeat about EU-Turkey relations in spite of the current impasse. He keeps the pressure up, asking for a "long awaited revitalization" of Turkey's political reform process. And he also attempts to allay Turkish irritation on the failure to extend visa-free travel to Turks throughout the EU. He reaffirms that the Justice and Home Affairs Council in February of this year "has opened a clear perspective" on the visa issue. Here, I assume that he is referring to the conclusions from February 24-25, according to which said council
invites the Commission, the Member States and Turkey to intensify their cooperation on visa issues, ensuring harmonised implementation of practical improvements for Turkish visa applicants within the framework of the EU Visa Code and asks the Commission to regularly report to the Council in this respectBut this is hardly revolutionary. It basically amounts to a "let's work harder." And the Cypriot delegation's addendum to this conclusion doesn't make things better:
The joint declaration on the cooperation in the area of visa policy, appears to establish a direct link between the readmission agreement and a visa dialogue. Our understanding is that the implementation in good faith of the readmission agreement is a sine qua non condition for the pursuit of such dialogue. Furthermore it has to be clear that the readmission agreement and the joint declaration do not commit the EU in a dialogue aiming towards a visa facilitation or liberalization.
Here, the Cypriot delegation denies the existence of any link between the readmission agreement (according to which Turkey would accept back into Turkey all migrants who enter the EU "illegally" through Turkey and then ensure their "repatriation" to their country of origin), which the EU wants Turkey to implement, and the visa-waiver that Turkey wants the EU to implement. [Correction: To be accurate, the statement doesn't deny the link, it just makes implementation of the readmission agreement a precondition for "dialogue" on the visa waiver matter.] In contrast to the Cypriot delegation, Turkish politicians have been making the link between these two items explicitly, in effect calling for a quid-pro-quo mutual implementation of both. In the words of one Turkish official:
A final reflection on Füle's remarks is that his wording appears deliberate. It seems to me at least that his choice of words are meant to appease those actors in the EU who are aiming for a "privileged partnership" of one form or another. "Looking to the future," he argues, "our common challenge is to deepen European Union-Turkey integration even further. The accession negotiations are the best tool to do this." Perhaps I am reading into this, but such a statement - stopping short of reaffirming accession as the goal - appear to be so designed as to not provoke the "partnership" crowd. Anyway, you can judge for yourself:Nothing is happening on the visa question and they want us to sign the re-admission agreement. Well sorry that is not going to happen.
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
A Turkish German's truth: 'It's not us and them' | The Globe and Mail
He has two urgent messages. To ethnic Germans, he says: Forget the debate about culture; it’s over. Let’s talk about how to turn everyone living in Germany into a full citizen. To Turks, he says: Forget about Turkey. You’re German now, not part of a long-forgotten homeland’s diaspora. Start acting like it, learn the language and become citizens.
Austria to hold referendum on Turkish EU accession
"What's with Austria?!?" This was how a colleague of mine responded to yesterday's post about the cross-national variation in levels of support for Turkish EU-accession. (Austria is, by far, least supportive of EU member states.) It is a valid question.
And the extremely low level of support for Turkish EU membership in the country has political consequences. Understandably, Austrian politicians are reluctant to take a stand and try to push through such an unpopular issue. The natural - albeit cowardly - response is to "let the people decide." Austrian Chancellor has used the occasion to reaffirm its decision to put Turkey's EU bid before the Austrian people EurActiv Turkey reports:
"Even in the case of a positive decision after the negotiations between the EU and Turkey, we will organise a referendum in Austria on this topic," Faymann was quoted as saying by Turkish daily Hürriyet.
In all honesty, it is overly generous to present this as a response by the Austrian leadership to existing popular sentiments. There is probably an element of this - collective memories of 1683 perhaps - but the two largest parties as well as much of the media establishment is resolutely against letting Turkey in. On this issue, they are as much the leaders of opinion as they follow it.
Of course, Austria is not alone. France has taken a similar position on the issue of referendam, and for Turkey this clearly spells trouble. The accession of a new member state requires the consent of all existing members. Thus, EurActiv phrasing of the Turkish reaction to the Austrian Chancellor's statement - made on the occasion of Turkish President Abdullah Gül's visit to the country no less - is probably somewhat of an understatement):
Of course, Austria is not alone. France has taken a similar position on the issue of referendam, and for Turkey this clearly spells trouble. The accession of a new member state requires the consent of all existing members. Thus, EurActiv phrasing of the Turkish reaction to the Austrian Chancellor's statement - made on the occasion of Turkish President Abdullah Gül's visit to the country no less - is probably somewhat of an understatement):
The statement apparently left Ankara unimpressed.http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/austria-mulls-turkey-referendum-ankara-unimpressed-news-504579?utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=8299b828e4-my_google_analytics_key&utm_medium=email
Wednesday, May 11, 2011
Cross-national differences in support for Turkish EU membership
My forthcoming book includes some graphs showing support in EU member states for Turkish EU accession compared to other applicant states. But I do not break these figures down by member state. Since I have this platform, I thought I would give my readers a taste of this data here instead.
The following graph is from one of the 2008 Eurobarometers (a set of surveys regularly conducted by the EU Commission on a range of topics). It does not include answers from Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. I have excluded 'Don't know' answers and calculated percentages on the proportion of respondents favoring vs opposing Turkish EU membership.
It is clear that Turkey receives its most enthusiastic support from the new member states from Eastern and Central Europe. After them, Sweden and the UK provides the most support.
As for the resistance to Turkish EU membership, it is by far strongest in Austria, followed by the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus, western Germany, Luxembourg, France, Eastern Germany, and Greece. A majority of all respondents (60% on this crunching of the data) oppose Turkey's accession.
For a qualitative perspective, you can also get a sense of this cross-national variety of views on this issue from the anthology edited by Nathalie Tocci as part of the Italian institute of international affairs (IAI)'s Quaderni English series. (It is available online here).
Sunday, May 8, 2011
Islamophobia in the Wake of Bin Laden's Death - National - The Atlantic Wire
The Atlanticwire.com reports that an Atlantic Southeast Airlines pilot diverted his flight to Memphis International Airport and ordered two Imams in traditional attire off the plane. The two had already been through the normal as well as additional airport security screenings:
One of the men, Masudur Rahman, an adjunct instructor of Arabic at the University of Memphis, said they were told the pilot refused to accept them because some other passengers could be uncomfortable. As both men were clerics, they were dressed in the traditional garb, including skullcaps.
Friday, May 6, 2011
The breadth of Turkish security policy
Last week, I attended a talk at the Swedish Institute of Foreign Affairs by Dr. Ebru S. Canan-Sokullu, Ass. Professor at Baçheşehir University, Istanbul. The title of her talk was "Turkey's Security Policy in the 21st Century: Change or Continuity?" and it was a very useful and broad overview of Turkish foreign and security policy. I have been meaning to blog about it but haven't had the time, but here are my thoughts.
To me, the very breadth of Dr. Canan-Sokullu's talk was one of the main take-home points. She covered Turkish policy in the Balkans, toward the EU, Russia, NATO, Israel, and the Middle East, as well as more general points about the various dimensions of the foreign policy shift that can be observed with the AKP leadership at the helm, and about such notions as Davutoğlu's "strategic depth." (What she consciously skipped - to my great sorrow - was a slide on Turkey-EU relations, about which she has at least written a book chapter
.)
One of the questions she raised was whether there has been a distinct shift toward the East, which I have discussed elsewhere on this blog. As far as I gathered (and recall - I took too few notes, I am afraid), she never came down clearly on one or the other side of the issue but on my interpretation, her entire presentation illustrated the broader nature of the Turkish foreign policy reorientation.
There is no doubt that Turkey has increased trade with and its policy presence in the Middle East (the New York Times has a good piece about the triumphs and pitfalls of this policy in light of the Arab uprisings). It is also clear that the AKP leadership is more cautious in its embrace of NATO policies, as Prof. Canan-Sokullu herself argues (link in Turkish), and it is decidedly unhappy with Israel after its 2008-09 Gaza offensive, which Erdoğan likely took as a personal insult.
But perhaps a better metaphor than the "going East" narrative provides, is of an increasingly well-rounded Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has enhanced its cooperation with Iran and pre-revolt Syria, but those aren't the only neighbors whom Turkey has courted: The EU still accounts for the majority of Turkish trade and its significance to Turkey is perhaps best evidenced by the extensive and often painful reform process that the Turkish leadership has been pursuing over the past decade, despite the often less than lukewarm response from the EU.
Moreover, I recently spoke to someone who has been stationed at the Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo, who emphasized the constructive role that Turkey was playing in Bosnia and the greater region. And thanks to "earthquake" and "soccer diplomacy," Turkey-Greek relations are better now than they have been for many decades, perhaps since before the coup and invasion of Cyprus. Similarly, Turkey has clearly also attempted a rapprochement with Armenia, albeit with moderate success.
Former US ambassador to Turkey, Michael Lake, uses yet another metaphor to describe Turkish foreign policy: On his take, Turkey views its foreign policy as standing on three legs. The first two are the U.S. and Europe, and the third is now the Middle East. This is helpful, but it still somewhat obscures the conscious attempt by Turkey with Davutoğlu at the helm and as its intellectual architect, to develop a well-rounded foreign policy with all its neighbors.
To me, as I said, this breadth was the main take-home point from the very broad overview of Turkish foreign and security policy given by Prof. Canan-Sokullu in Stockholm last week.
---
UPDATE April 10, 2011
Prof. Canan-Sokullu shared a link to an English version of her research note on support for NATO policies: Here. And I might as well clarify her findings while I am on the topic. From the research note:
To me, the very breadth of Dr. Canan-Sokullu's talk was one of the main take-home points. She covered Turkish policy in the Balkans, toward the EU, Russia, NATO, Israel, and the Middle East, as well as more general points about the various dimensions of the foreign policy shift that can be observed with the AKP leadership at the helm, and about such notions as Davutoğlu's "strategic depth." (What she consciously skipped - to my great sorrow - was a slide on Turkey-EU relations, about which she has at least written a book chapter
.)One of the questions she raised was whether there has been a distinct shift toward the East, which I have discussed elsewhere on this blog. As far as I gathered (and recall - I took too few notes, I am afraid), she never came down clearly on one or the other side of the issue but on my interpretation, her entire presentation illustrated the broader nature of the Turkish foreign policy reorientation.
There is no doubt that Turkey has increased trade with and its policy presence in the Middle East (the New York Times has a good piece about the triumphs and pitfalls of this policy in light of the Arab uprisings). It is also clear that the AKP leadership is more cautious in its embrace of NATO policies, as Prof. Canan-Sokullu herself argues (link in Turkish), and it is decidedly unhappy with Israel after its 2008-09 Gaza offensive, which Erdoğan likely took as a personal insult.
But perhaps a better metaphor than the "going East" narrative provides, is of an increasingly well-rounded Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has enhanced its cooperation with Iran and pre-revolt Syria, but those aren't the only neighbors whom Turkey has courted: The EU still accounts for the majority of Turkish trade and its significance to Turkey is perhaps best evidenced by the extensive and often painful reform process that the Turkish leadership has been pursuing over the past decade, despite the often less than lukewarm response from the EU.
Moreover, I recently spoke to someone who has been stationed at the Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo, who emphasized the constructive role that Turkey was playing in Bosnia and the greater region. And thanks to "earthquake" and "soccer diplomacy," Turkey-Greek relations are better now than they have been for many decades, perhaps since before the coup and invasion of Cyprus. Similarly, Turkey has clearly also attempted a rapprochement with Armenia, albeit with moderate success.
Former US ambassador to Turkey, Michael Lake, uses yet another metaphor to describe Turkish foreign policy: On his take, Turkey views its foreign policy as standing on three legs. The first two are the U.S. and Europe, and the third is now the Middle East. This is helpful, but it still somewhat obscures the conscious attempt by Turkey with Davutoğlu at the helm and as its intellectual architect, to develop a well-rounded foreign policy with all its neighbors.
To me, as I said, this breadth was the main take-home point from the very broad overview of Turkish foreign and security policy given by Prof. Canan-Sokullu in Stockholm last week.
---
UPDATE April 10, 2011
Prof. Canan-Sokullu shared a link to an English version of her research note on support for NATO policies: Here. And I might as well clarify her findings while I am on the topic. From the research note:
The results show that MHP supporters are the fiercest anti-NATO group, AKP supporters are rather moderately against NATO. Those who support CHP have adopted consistently negative attitudes to NATO over time.
Kurdish Rebels Claim Attack | NYTimes.com
Sebnem Arsu of the New York Times reports that the PKK has claimed responsibility for the recent attack on a convoy in which Prime Minister Erdoğan had traveled moments earlier:
Kurdish separatists claimed responsibility on Thursday for the attack on the prime minister’s campaign convoy the day before, the semi-official Anatolian News Agency reported. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was not travelling with the convoy when it was attacked by a group of five or six gunmen, reported to be members of the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party, near Kastamonu, a Black Sea port. One policeman was killed. The governor of Kastamonu, Erdogan Bektas, said the attack was not an attempt on the prime minister’s life but simply aimed at stirring chaos.
Thursday, May 5, 2011
Erdoğan escapes assassination attempt?
This just in from the NYT:
Unidentified attackers in northern Turkey opened fire Wednesday on a campaign convoy belonging to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s party, killing one police officer and wounding another, local officials said.
The attack came after Mr. Erdogan had left the convoy. It was unclear whether he had been the intended target.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)